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Abstract:
During World War I, the Swiss state interned nearly 30,000 foreign soldiers who had previ-
ously been held in POW camps in Germany, France, Britain, Belgium, Austria, and Russia. The 
internment camp system that Switzerland implemented arose from the Swiss diplomatic platform 
of defensive humanitarianism. By offering good offices to the belligerent states of WWI, the Swiss 
state utilized humanitarian law both to secure Swiss neutrality and to alleviate, to a degree, the 
immense human suffering of the war. The Swiss government mixed domestic security concerns 
with international diplomacy and humanitarianism. They elevated a domestic policy platform to 
the international diplomatic level and succeeded in building enough trust between the party states 
to create an internment system that reconceptualized the treatment of foreign soldiers from the 
holding of prisoners to the healing of men. 
Introduction
On July 27, 1916, William McGilvray, a sergeant in the London Scottish Reg-
iment, found himself riding in a passenger 
train travelling south through Germany, sur-
veying the landscape of the Rhine River val-
ley. It was quiet, the sounds of the sloshing 
mud and whizzing bullets of trench warfare 
far off to the west. He had started that day 
in Friedrichsfeld, one of the many prisoner 
of war camps in Germany that detained Al-
lied soldiers. He would arrive that evening 
in Darmstadt to connect with another train 
brimming with other British prisoners of war. 
His journey would bring him to Konstanz, 
Germany, for examination before internment 
in Switzerland, as Konstanz was the last 
stop before entry into Switzerland.1 McGil-
1 The city’s English name is Constance. It is located on 
the Bodensee, or Lake Constance, in southern Germa-
ny along its border with Switzerland.
vray, along with 305 of his compatriots, were 
among the first British POWs imprisoned in 
Germany to be evaluated for internment in 
Switzerland, where the physical conditions 
far outshined those in Friedrichsfeld. Crowds 
of Swiss citizens at the train stations of Zu-
rich, Lausanne, Montreux, and finally Cha-
teaux D’Oex would soon greet him. Speech-
es by Swiss and British military, government, 
and Red Cross officials would welcome him 
and the other soldiers throughout their jour-
ney, as well as music, gifts, and warm meals. 
His experiences and perceptions were echoed 
by many soldiers in Switzerland interned 
during World War I, including those from 
France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bel-
gium, and Russia. 
In the centuries before these soldiers ar-
rived in Switzerland, distinct legal factors that 
shaped and allowed for the creation of the in-
ternment camp system had already emerged. 
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First, a body of international law existed in 
Europe, particularly in the form of the Gene-
va Convention of 1864 and The Hague con-
ventions of 1899 and 1907. Both specifically 
dealt with the rules of war and the treatment 
of soldiers, POWs, internees, and civilians 
during war. The internationally agreed upon 
instructions of these assemblies dictated, to 
an extent, the treatment of soldiers and civil-
ians, captive or not, in times of war. Second, 
Switzerland’s nearly 300 years of neutrality 
in the European arena continued to shape its 
diplomatic platform in the early 1900s. These 
factors did not exist as independent develop-
ments, but they grew in the same intellectual 
spaces in Europe. In response to the crisis of 
World War I, Swiss diplomats and statesmen 
utilized the tools at hand to merge interna-
tional law, Switzerland’s aggressive neutral-
ity politics, and the ideology of humanitari-
anism into a cohesive diplomatic platform to 
protect Swiss sovereignty. 
The ICRC and Swiss state implemented 
its first internment camp system in 1871 with 
the experimental internment of the Bourbaki 
Army. The internment of the French Bour-
baki Army during the Franco-Prussian War 
acted as a practical trial for the later Swiss 
internment camp system during WWI. The 
French and Prussian governments signed an 
armistice agreement to end the conflict on 
January 27, 1871, however, the agreement did 
not extend to the Army of the East. To avoid 
further losses, the Bourbaki Army sought ref-
uge in Switzerland, initiating deliberations 
between the French and Swiss Armies. On 
February 1, the Swiss General Hans Herzog 
and French General Justin Clinchant signed 
an internment agreement which promised 
medical attention, lodging, and protection 
within Switzerland for all 87,847 troops of 
the French Army of the East, as long as the 
French troops handed over their weapons to 
the Swiss military.2 The Prussians did not at-
tend these talks. The Swiss Army managed 
the internment of the French soldiers in co-
ordination with the Swiss Red Cross, sub-
sequently dispersing the soldiers throughout 
the country. The successful internment of the 
Bourbaki Army set the stage for the intern-
ment camp system during WWI.
The internment camp system in Switzer-
land during World War I acted as the inter-
section between international law, Swiss neu-
trality politics, and humanitarianism. This 
intersection formed a new policy referred to 
in this paper as defensive humanitarianism.3 
Due to its successes in WWI, this policy 
platform would later come to define Swiss 
international relations and the Swiss image 
internationally in the decades that followed. 
These conclusions may be drawn from the 
body of secondary and primary source litera-
ture on the Swiss internment camps, human-
itarianism, international relations, WWI, and 
Swiss and European history.  
The topic of internment camps in Swit-
zerland during World War I and their impact 
on humanitarianism, Swiss politics, and Eu-
ropean history is woefully understudied, par-
ticularly in the English language. These areas 
rarely overlap with each other in the litera-
ture, as historians generally examine them 
separately. It is important to analyze this sit-
uation from the perspective of international 
diplomacy and the role of Swiss “good of-
2 Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, “Die Internierung der 
französischen Bourbaki-Armee in der Schweiz,” Sch-
weizerisches Rotes Kreuz, accessed April 15th, 2016.
3 This is a term created for this paper in order to suc-
cinctly explain Swiss diplomacy since WWI. I have 
found no records of this term elsewhere. 
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fices,” or the offering by a third party state 
to facilitate peaceful mediation between two 
opposing states. 4 The idea of Swiss good of-
fices greatly informed the idea of defensive 
humanitarianism in this paper and will be 
discussed in section one. 
There is no dispute among historians that 
the international laws, treaties, and agree-
ments surrounding POWs, internees, and 
civilians affected by WWI further expanded 
in scope during the conflict. However, many 
scholars have greatly limited the role of the 
Swiss state and the Swiss internment camp 
system in their conclusions.5 These historians 
minimalize the importance of small-player 
states in their explanatory framework, which 
views this evolution as an effort on the part of 
major-player states, specifically Great Brit-
ain, the United States, Germany, and France 
to lessen the suffering of soldiers and civil-
ians in a war of attrition. Others briefly men-
tion the Swiss internment camp system in 
their discussion of WWI diplomacy, but only 
as a small-scale humanitarian project that did 
not significantly impact the war. Rather, they 
argue that it merely created enough proof of 
good intentions to allow for the larger bellig-
erent states to collaborate on later bilateral 
agreements.6 In an atmosphere that focused 
on the actions and diplomatic platforms of 
belligerent and major-player states, the histo-
4 When a state offers good offices, they act as a third 
party facilitator of negotiations. See Raymond R. 
Probst, ‘Good Offices’ in the Light of Swiss Inter-
national Practice and Experience, (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), 1989. 
5 John Yarnall, Barbed Wire Disease: British & Ger-
man Prisoners of War, 1914-19, (Stroud, UK: History 
Press), 2011. 
6 Richard B. Speed III, Prisoners, Diplomats, and the 
Great War: A Study in the Diplomacy of Captivity, 
(New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 33-38. 
riography of this period failed to look at the 
other smaller, but still influential, actors. This 
paper seeks to amend the shortcomings of 
this era’s historiography by acknowledging 
the strong role of international diplomacy in 
WWI as facilitated through the good offices 
of smaller actors, specifically highlighting 
the Swiss case and its unique contributions to 
the legacy of international law. 
Those historians, Swiss or otherwise, 
who focus on Swiss internment camps in par-
ticular have traditionally approached it from 
the position of a history of neutrality and in-
ternational relations. In the historiography of 
Switzerland during WWI, some historians 
maintain that the Swiss government acted as 
the main actor on the international scene, and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) worked as a secondary collaborator.7 
This ignores the collaboration of the ICRC 
with the Swiss government and military on 
the internment camp system, as well as their 
larger international roll as the progenitor of 
national Red Cross societies. Others have ap-
proached the history of the internment camp 
system as only part of the history of human-
itarianism and the ICRC, removing the dip-
lomatic history included in this paper. This 
strain of the historiography looks at the Swiss 
state only as a practical facilitator, possessing 
the bureaucratic framework and institutional 
resources to physically construct and manage 
the camps, not on its role as sovereign power 
and negotiator.8 This paper argues that do-
mestic Swiss neutrality politics and the inter-
7 Georges André Chevallaz, The Challenge of Neutral-
ity: Diplomacy and the Defense of Switzerland, (Lan-
ham, MD: Lexington Books), 2001. 
8 David P Forsythe and Barbara Ann J Rieffer-Flana-
gan, The International Committee of the Red Cross: A 
Neutral Humanitarian Actor, (Abingdon: Routledge, 
Taylor & Francis Group), 2016.
28
national humanitarian ideology of the ICRC 
intersected in the diplomatic platform of the 
Swiss state, leading to the formation of the 
internment camp system, which necessitated 
both the Swiss state and the ICRC as similar-
ly important actors.  
There are exceptions to the disinterest 
in Swiss internment camps and their unique 
characteristics. Some recent scholarship 
within the historiography of Swiss history 
gives a general overview of life in the Swiss 
internment camps. This focuses on its eco-
nomic benefits in the area of Swiss tourism, 
as well as on the role of women in Switzer-
land during WWI.9 The focus on the benefits 
of the internment camp system for the Swiss 
economy and the roles of women in the in-
ternment system represents a new area of ex-
ploration. However, historians of this subject 
have failed to recognize the unique blend of 
the domestic needs for neutrality and the in-
ternational movement of goods and people 
for the Swiss economy with the ideas and 
institutions of international humanitarianism. 
This paper builds on this economic focus on 
the internment camp system by contextual-
izing its place in the debate in tandem with 
the international diplomacy and humanitari-
anism pieces. 
Since the turn of the 21st century histo-
rians of Switzerland have increasingly stud-
ied Swiss history by assessing the situation 
through a combination of political, diplo-
matic, economic, or social lenses. According 
to recent works of history on Switzerland, 
neutrality concerns continue to rule as the 
dominant Swiss interest in Swiss internation-
9 Susan Barton, “Dropped from ‘ell into ‘eaven: In-
terned POWS in Switzerland 1916-1918,” Accessed 
February 16, 2018, http://www.ruralhistory2015.org/
doc/papers/Panel_12_Barton.pdf. 
al relations during WWI. However, scholars 
have also increasingly portrayed the influ-
ence of neutrality politics on areas such as 
the Swiss economy and the Swiss identity 
inside and outside of Switzerland.10 Some of 
the newest scholarship focuses on the situa-
tion of specific internee groups within Swit-
zerland; though these works are beyond the 
purview of this paper.11 Most notable among 
the scholars of the Swiss WWI internment 
camps is Dr. Cédric Cotter, whose work fo-
cuses on the connection between neutrality 
and humanitarianism in Switzerland, and its 
meaning for Swiss diplomacy and the Swiss 
identity.12 Cotter offers many important in-
sights into the political situation of the Swiss 
state during WWI, arguing that the issue of 
neutrality functioned as the central concern 
for the Swiss Bundesrat in its decision to pur-
sue the internment camp system.13 This paper 
constructs the idea of defensive humanitari-
anism by combining the insights of Cotter on 
the neutrality and international humanitarian 
aspects of the internment camp system with 
the economic impetuses of other recent histo-
rians in order to form a more holistic picture 
of the Swiss situation. By looking at the in-
ternment camp system as a microcosm of the 
political, humanitarian, and economic devel-
10 Max Mittler, Der Weg Zum Ersten Weltkrieg - 
Wie Neutral War Die Schweiz?: Kleinstaat und Eu-
ropäischer Imperialismus, (Zürich: Neue Zürcher Zei-
tung), 2003.
11 For information on Russian internees in Switzerland 
during WWI, see Thomas Bürgisser, “Unerwünschte 
Gäste”: russische Soldaten in der Schweiz 1915-1920, 
(Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 2010). 
12 Cédric Cotter, (s’)Aider pour survivre: action hu-
manitaire et neutralité suisse pendant la Première 
Guerre mondiale, (Geneva: University of Geneva), 
2016.
13 The Swiss Bundesrat is the Swiss Parliament. Swit-
zerland is the only direct democracy in the world.  
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opments and crises of WWI, this paper offers 
new insights into the domestic and interna-
tional impacts of the camps on Switzerland 
and Europe during and after WWI.  These 
insights are possible due to the large body 
of primary source literature from the ICRC, 
Swiss government, and Swiss military that 
draw out the interconnected nature of inter-
national law, neutrality politics, and interna-
tional humanitarianism.   
The primary sources available on this 
topic exist due to the archival practices of 
the Swiss state, military, and the ICRC. The 
Swiss army in particular took meticulous care 
in preserving its correspondence with outside 
governments, as well as their internal briefs, 
notices, and telegrams, all of which can be 
found in the Swiss Federal Archives in Bern. 
These sources form the primary basis of this 
paper. In addition, Major Édouard Favre, Sur-
geon General and head of the internment sys-
tem within the Swiss army, published three 
reports on the workings of the camps and his 
reflections on them.14 These reports synthesize 
many of the documents found in the Federal 
Archives. This paper employs them more fre-
quently than the original papers, as they offer 
the factual information of the originals, but 
include his commentary as the highest-rank-
ing administrator in the internment camp sys-
tem. His insights begin with the formation of 
the internment camps and continue through 
to the repatriation of the internees, and offer 
both his subjective and objective notes on 
the functioning of the camps. These notes are 
14 Edouard Favre, Harvey W. Hewett-Thayer, and Karl 
Hauser, Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War: An Ex-
periment in International Humane Legislation and 
Administration: A Report from the Swiss Commission 
in the United States, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1917).
useful as their intended audience members of 
the Swiss military, who managed the opera-
tion of the internment camps. 
In addition, British Lieutenant-Colonel 
Henry Philip Picot published his memoirs of 
his time as a British diplomatic administra-
tor involved with the camps, including the 
reception of British internees in 1916.15 His 
memoir, The British Interned in Switzerland, 
relays many anecdotes on the reception of 
interned soldiers in Switzerland, it presents 
the limitation of the British populace acting 
as its primary audience. It must be examined 
with extra scrutiny due to Picot’s tendency 
towards embellishment and the propagandis-
tic role of his writings. 
While Favre, as a ranking official in the 
Swiss military, had a bias towards the im-
portance of Swiss neutrality politics, Picot 
stressed the importance of international law 
and diplomacy as a British diplomat in his 
papers. The reports by Favre and Picot allow 
this paper to draw conclusions on how actors 
within each an individual area of influence 
conceived of the roles of international, do-
mestic, and humanitarian issues in relation to 
each other in the context of the internment 
camp system. The methodology used here 
differs from the methodologies of other his-
torians of Swiss diplomacy and Swiss history 
by examining these documents as part of the 
larger idea of defensive humanitarianism.16  
15 Henry Philip Picot, The British interned in Switzer-
land, (London: Edward Arnold, 1919).
16 Many of Cotter’s academic works look at the re-
lationship between the Swiss state and humanitarian-
ism; however, this paper broadens the scope of this 
debate by observing the evolution of international hu-
manitarianism through bi- or multilateral treaties not 
necessarily facilitated by the Swiss state. In addition, 
this paper brings in the issues of the stagnating Swiss 
economy and tensions of cultural nationalism within 
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The structure of this paper is both themat-
ic and chronological and utilizes a telescoped 
structure. Each section examines defensive 
humanitarianism and the internment camp 
system from increasingly focused perspec-
tives. Section one examines the context of 
Swiss neutrality politics in treaty negotiations 
during WWI before the full implementation 
of the internment camp system, narrowing the 
focus thematically to defensive humanitarian-
ism in practice and chronologically to 1914-
1916. Next, section two further restricts the 
scope to the structure of the internment camp 
system in practice, and the experiences of in-
dividual internees. This allows for an evalua-
tion of defensive humanitarianism at the level 
of individual experiences. The narrowing in 
sequential sections from the broad, interna-
tional developments to the individuals im-
pacted by the internment camp system allows 
this paper to connect the areas of international 
law, neutrality politics, and humanitarianism 
at increasingly focused levels in order to ex-
plain how they merge to form the policy plat-
form of defensive humanitarianism.
Finally, the conclusion of this paper fo-
cuses on the international response to the 
Swiss internment camps and their effects on 
later Swiss diplomacy, as well as their impact 
on the evolution of humanitarianism. The 
conclusion seeks to offer explanations for 
the role of neutrality and humanitarianism in 
Switzerland, as well as to offer insights into 
the unique Swiss position in global politics 
and diplomacy. With the current centennial 
Switzerland when evaluating the drivers behind Swiss 
governmental policy. Finally, the major difference be-
tween Cotter’s work and the conclusions of this paper 
arise from the use of defensive humanitarianism as s 
unifying concept that explains the merging of these 
different factors into a coherent policy platform imple-
mented by the Swiss state during WWI.  
commemoration of WWI, the parallels be-
tween international law, neutrality, and hu-
manitarian issues in WWI versus the present 
make the subject of defensive humanitarian-
ism relevant today in 2018. In an increasing-
ly globalized world that is currently seeing 
the largest states isolating themselves from 
international trade, politics, and humanitar-
ianism, smaller players may well again rise 
to meet the current crises as Switzerland did 
during WWI. Historiographically, this paper 
pioneers a new methodology for understand-
ing not only the Swiss internment camp sys-
tem during WWI, but also the larger debates 
around humanitarianism, diplomacy, and 
WWI in Switzerland and Europe currently 
absent in the historical literature through the 
idea of defensive humanitarianism. 
Creation of the Internment Camp System
Despite the long history of Swiss neu-
trality, the Swiss military nonetheless feared 
that Swiss neutrality would be violated when 
World War I erupted in August of 1914. Ger-
many had breached the eastern Belgian bor-
der on August 4, 1914, just seven days after 
the beginning of the war, despite more than 
80 years of Belgian neutrality. In addition 
to the external threat to Swiss neutrality, an 
internal rift also existed between the west-
ern and eastern regions of the country. Since 
the creation of the German Reich in 1871, 
the western region of Switzerland, Roman-
die, inhabited primarily by French speakers 
supported France, while the eastern region 
with a German-speaking majority supported 
Germany.17 This schism, created by linguistic 
and cultural loyalties in an era of intense cul-
17 Carlo Moos, “Domestic Politics and Neutrality 
(Switzerland),” International Encyclopedia of the 
First World War, published January 24th, 2017.
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tural nationalism, threatened Swiss neutrality 
from within by destabilizing popular support 
for Swiss neutrality and giving the appear-
ance of popular support for either the Central 
Powers or the Allied Forces. The Swiss gov-
ernment and military, therefore, searched for 
a solution that could solve both the external 
and internal issues simultaneously.  By main-
taining absolute international neutrality with 
a policy platform of defensive humanitari-
anism, the Swiss hoped to defuse competing 
cultural nationalisms at home and preserve 
their territorial sovereignty through neutral 
international diplomacy and politics abroad. 
Already in 1914, the initial rumblings of 
a future internment plan started at the ground 
level in two places: Geneva and Rome. The 
Vatican began advocating for prisoner ex-
changes for incapacitated POWs starting in 
late 1914, on humanitarian grounds.18 The In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross first 
proposed the plan for the internment of mild-
ly injured prisoners of war in Switzerland 
in 1914. With the permission of the Swiss 
government, the ICRC began treaty talks 
with France and Germany. In addition to the 
urgings of the ICRC, the Holy See, through 
their representative Charles Santucci, also 
campaigned for the broadening of ailments 
and ranks meriting internment, as they saw 
the prospect of internment too important an 
opportunity for POWs to restrict to only tu-
berculosis patients.19 On March 6, 1915, after 
securing a loose agreement of the terms of 
internment, the president of the ICRC, Gus-
tav Ador, wrote to the president of Switzer-
land, Giuseppe Motta, asking for the Swiss 
government to take over treaty negotiations:
18 Yarnall, 155. 
19 Picot, 36.
Our Committee is continuing with the 
realization of the project, which I have 
spoken to you of interning in Switzer-
land the wounded officers whom they 
would not wish to return to their coun-
try of origin. I take the liberty of ask-
ing you again to support this proposal 
with your high influence. There are 
so many families of officers in Ger-
many, France, and England, who wait 
with anguish for the realization of this 
project, that if it were not to succeed, 
it would be a cruel disappointment. 
Do you not think that it would be a 
very good thing for the Federal Coun-
cil to officially submit this proposal to 
the governments concerned? I know 
that you agree with this idea and I am 
quite sure that no government would 
oppose a refusal to a firm proposal 
made by the Federal Council.20 
While the ICRC initiated the talks between 
France and Germany on the subject of pris-
oners of war, they, even with the support of 
the Holy See, could not exert enough pres-
sure upon either government to come to an 
agreement. Diplomacy at this stage of the 
war was tense; without being able to offer 
good offices, the Vatican and ICRC failed to 
instill the same sense of trust that the Swiss 
state had during the internment of the French 
Army of the East.
On May 1, 1915, the Swiss government, 
with backing by both the ICRC and the Holy 
See, reinitiated and finalized the negotiations 
between France and Germany. The Swiss 
delegation’s offering of good offices played 
20 Édouard Favre, L’Internment en Suisse, (Geneva: 
Georg, 1917), 188.
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no small part in bringing the two powers to 
the table.21 In addition, assurances that Swiss 
military order would prevent soldiers from 
escaping, as well as the belligerent states 
agreeing to return caught escapees, led to 
the signing of an agreement on January 26, 
1916.22 The Swiss government and military 
readily seized the opportunity presented by 
the ICRC and Holy See to press the agree-
ment talks between France and Germany to 
a conclusion, in order to both transform in-
ternal pressures into interest for the soon-to-
arrive soldiers and to secure external respect 
for Swiss neutrality. The Swiss defensive 
humanitarianism platform combined the in-
ternal and external threats to the Swiss state 
into one coherent solution. The signing of the 
treaty on January 26, however, did not itself 
initiate the transferring of prisoners of war 
into Switzerland.
For the following three weeks, negoti-
ation on the terms of internment continued. 
The issues most intensely discussed includ-
ed the definition of internment, methods for 
surveillance of prisoner of war camps in bel-
ligerent states, selection criteria, and the con-
ditions on returning soldiers after the conflict 
ceased. Many of the issues of contention fo-
cused on which diseases and injuries warrant-
ed internment in Switzerland, and which did 
not. To settle this issue, the Surgeon-General 
of Switzerland created the Bureau of Intern-
ment within the medical branch of the Swiss 
military, which conducted a temporary intern-
ment period with 100 French and 100 German 
prisoners of war suffering from tuberculosis 
in the towns of Davos, Montana, and Ley-
21 Probst, 20. 
22 François Olier, “Suisse (1914-1918): L’Internement 
des Prisonniers de Guerre Allies, Malades et Blesses,” 
accessed March 5, 2017.
sin.23 This temporary internment functioned 
as a barometer for the trust of the belligerent 
signatories. As the test showed early success, 
France and Germany warmed to the idea of 
accepting the Swiss internment camp system 
on a full scale. On February 14, France, Ger-
many, and Switzerland came to an agreement 
on the final terms of internment. 
The previous understanding of intern-
ment, as suggested in the Geneva Conven-
tion, had entailed the safe movement of pris-
oners of war. This included soldiers incapable 
of fighting in the future, with their departure 
leading them through a neutral state back to 
their homeland. It also allowed for intern-
ment within neutral states. The agreement 
between France and Germany defined intern-
ment as the removal of prisoners of war from 
these states to Switzerland for medical care 
in Swiss facilities. The treaty also included 
clauses promising the return of interned sol-
diers to Switzerland if they escaped to their 
home country.24 The codification of Swiss 
defensive humanitarianism into this inter-
national treaty benefited not only the Swiss 
state, but the belligerent states and the intern-
ees as well. Defensive humanitarianism rep-
resented a unique form of diplomatic policy, 
as it benefited all states involved.   
The arrival of these initial internees in 
Switzerland created a spark of celebration for 
the Swiss populace. Those healthy enough 
to walk went first with canes and flowers, 
the latter given to them by members of the 
crowd. Soldiers too sick to walk continued 
23 Édouard Favre, “Swiss Internment of Prisoners of 
War: An Experiment in International Humane Legis-
lation and Administration: a Report by the Swiss Com-
mission in the United States,” (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1917), 10.
24 Picot, 37. 
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behind in cars.25 The Swiss populace came 
out in droves in celebration of their nation-
al project. Promoted as not only the saving 
plan for the Swiss economic and political 
situation, many in the government promoted 
the plan as the duty of the Swiss. This rhet-
oric set out to dispel the linguistic tensions 
of the country and promote Swiss national-
ism and identity.26 The Swiss government did 
not miss the chance to promote the evolution 
of international law and Switzerland’s role 
through the internment camp system inter-
nally or externally.
This new definition of internment creat-
ed by these treaties allowed for the opportu-
nity of extended healing in Switzerland for 
prisoners of war who had been excluded by 
the previous understanding of internment 
due to states not wanting injured soldiers re-
turning to enemy front lines. Deliberation on 
what ailments would now qualify under the 
new definition, however, took another three 
weeks after the original tentative agreement. 
The debate focused on short-term or easily 
treatable ailments that could not be manage-
ably treated in prisoner of war camps. By July 
1916, the French, German, and Swiss govern-
ments identified the 18 diseases in total that 
merited internment in Switzerland. These in-
cluded: chronic diseases of the blood, respi-
ratory, circulatory, central and peripheral ner-
vous systems, digestive organs, urinary and 
sexual organs, organs of the senses, the skin, 
rheumatism, as well as blindness and deaf-
ness. The majority of the internees fell under 
the criteria of suffering from Tuberculosis, 
tumors, severe debility, severe syphilis, loss 
25 Whitmarsh, “Prisoners of War Interned in Switzer-
land.” 
26 Roman Rossfeld, 14/18 Die Schweiz und der Grosse 
Krieg, (Zürich: Hier und Jetzt, 2014), 242.
of limb, long-term paralysis, maladies that 
would preclude military service for one year, 
and cases deemed severe enough on a case-
by-case basis.27 Tuberculosis represented 
an especially critical point to the concerned 
parties, as it had been previously disqualified 
during talks in 1914 before internment be-
came on option due to the chance for soldiers 
to recover and reenter the war.28 
Not all major conditions from which 
POWs suffered made the cut. Mental health 
afflictions, alcoholism, and sexually trans-
mitted diseases that could still be transmitted 
at the time of inspection were also exclud-
ed.29 The agreement excluded soldiers with 
mental health issues, as they referred these 
cases to special institutions and not general 
hospitals in Switzerland. It also proscribed 
soldiers with sexually transmitted diseases 
or infections, for fear of infecting citizens 
of the Swiss populace or family members of 
the soldiers.30 This list of ailments illustrated 
the level of strictness the countries involved 
desired for the agreement, as the belligerent 
governments, not the Swiss government, 
paid for the costs of interning their soldiers in 
Switzerland. This agreement greatly expand-
ed the number of soldiers removed from pris-
oner of war camps in belligerent states and 
greatly increased the chances of survival for 
wounded prisoners of war. Montana was one 
of the first towns open to internees and housed 
27 Swiss Government, “Vorbereitung für die kriegs-
rechtliche Internierung, u.a. Konventionsentwurf, 
1914-1915,” Dossier, E27#1000/721#13951*, (Sch-
weizerisches Bundesarchiv, Bern, Switzerland), Ac-
cessed June 7, 2017, note 3. 
28 Yarnall, 156.
29 “Vorbereitung für die kriegsrechtliche Internierung, 
u.a. Konventionsentwurf, 1914-1915,” note 3.
30 Great Britain, “Correspondence with the United 
States Ambassador Respecting the Transfer to Swit-
zerland of British and German Wounded and Sick 
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primarily French and Belgian citizens, as its 
populace predominately spoke French. Pri-
or to the war, tourists to the area had been 
predominately French. However, this consid-
eration on the familiarity of the locals with 
French nationals failed to take into account 
the mountainous terrain of the area, which 
was hard for wounded internees to traverse.31 
This failure in the practical planning of the 
internment camp system arose from how it 
came about: the hierarchical aspects of the 
camp, as well as the general rules, came out 
of the higher level treaty negotiations, while 
practical issues such as mobility on moun-
tainous terrain or division of internees from 
different states devolved to local officials.32 
While the issue of which ailments merited in-
ternment had come to a conclusion, there still 
existed the topic of how to select prisoners of 
war for internment. 
After France, Germany, and Switzerland 
reached an agreement on the terms, defini-
tion, and requirements of internment, they 
also debated the evaluation of soldiers for in-
ternment. This represented a critical point in 
the discussions, as it would ultimately decide 
the number of prisoners of war able to be in-
terned in Switzerland. At the beginning of de-
liberations, Germany called for an equal quo-
ta system in which only an equal number of 
soldiers from each state could be interned, as 
they worried about the possibility of French 
Combatant Prisoners of War,” (London: Harrison & 
Sons, 1916).
31 Yarnall, 158.
32 The internment camps were divided by type of care 
needed and ability, not necessarily only by linguistic 
familiarity. This is part of the reason different nation-
alities of internees existed in the same regions, or even 
towns. Favre, “Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War: 
An Experiment in International Humane Legislation 
and Administration: a Report by the Swiss Commis-
sion in the United States.” 
soldiers benefiting more from the system 
than the German soldiers. The Holy See, who 
sought to have the largest number of POWs 
ameliorated of their conditions and ailments 
as possible, frequently called on the German 
Kaiser Wilhelm II to agree to a case-by-case 
system. Germany eventually acquiesced, as 
long as neutral teams of medical personnel 
conducted the examinations.33 This system 
entailed “ten Sanitary Commissions for each 
country, composed of two Swiss doctors re-
inforced by a third, an officer of the captor 
States, who should have the place of Presi-
dent, with power to examine and designate 
prisoners for dispatch to Lyon or Constance, 
as the case might be, for a final inspection by 
a Board of Control.”34 In 1916 alone, the itin-
erant commission undertook twenty trips into 
Germany, reviewed 82,439 French soldiers 
and designated 20,677 for internment, while 
eighteen visits into France allowed for the 
examination of 46,339 German POWs, with 
6,411 selected.35 By having members of the 
selection committees from different states, 
this system allowed the belligerent states to 
trust that the other group would not receive 
preferential treatment. As defensive human-
itarianism requires collective trust to ensure 
its goals, clauses similar to the Sanitary Com-
mission were key to the policy’s success.
The Sanitary Commission then sent their 
selections of POWs for further evaluation in 
Konstanz if held in Germany or Austria, and 
Lyon if held in France, Britain, or Belgium 
before their final trip into Switzerland. These 
33 Picot, 37.
34 Favre, “Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War: An 
Experiment in International Humane Legislation and 
Administration: a Report by the Swiss Commission in 
the United States,” 9.
35 Speed, 35-36.
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major cities, closest to the Swiss border for 
each country and equipped with the railway 
infrastructure necessary for the transportation 
of the internees, represented logical choices 
for the main examination centers. Through 
the legal protections created by the Geneva 
and The Hague Conventions, the inspection 
teams could travel through war zones with 
reduced fear of assault, capture, or deter-
rence. The small group sizes also allowed for 
greater efficiency and mobility. The ICRC, 
Swiss Red Cross, and military medical units 
of France and Germany, with their Red Cross 
armbands in place, quickly situated the sani-
tary commissions. New soldiers began enter-
ing Switzerland on February 21, 1916, with 
an estimated maximum of 30,000 interned 
by January 1917.36 While the deliberations 
between France and Germany lasted over a 
year to reach this agreement, similar arrange-
ments between Germany and Great Britain, 
Austria-Hungary, and Belgium followed al-
most immediately thereafter. 
The relative speed with which Great Brit-
ain and Germany reached an agreement on 
internment of British and German prisoners 
of war in Switzerland occurred due to the fact 
that the United States, still a neutral power in 
1916, handled the majority of the communi-
cation for Great Britain. As the United States 
would not enter the conflict until one year 
later in 1917, they maintained their diplomat-
ic channels with Germany. Great Britain re-
quested that the United States’ ambassador in 
London communicate with his counterpart in 
Berlin to appeal on Great Britain’s behalf for 
an agreement on internment in Switzerland, 
36 Favre, “Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War: An 
Experiment in International Humane Legislation and 
Administration: a Report by the Swiss Commission in 
the United States,” 46.
similar to the one created between Germany 
and France. The communications lasted from 
March 25 to May 13, 1916, with nine mes-
sages in total exchanged between Sir Edward 
Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Britain, 
and W.H. Page, United States ambassador to 
Great Britain. That six of the nine messages 
came from Sir Grey illustrates the urgency felt 
by the British government to secure an agree-
ment for the internment of British soldiers 
held as prisoners of war in Germany.37 On 
April 9, the urgency of Sir Grey’s telegrams 
reached their climax, with him writing, “it is 
not possible to make an official request to the 
Swiss Government to inaugurate the neces-
sary arrangements pending the receipt of the 
reply of the German Government, and much 
unnecessary hardship is being caused by the 
failure of the German Government to send a 
reply.”38 The response on May 1 to this mes-
sage contained the German acceptance of the 
internment agreement with the same terms as 
the French agreement. Almost immediately, 
on May 14, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Philip 
Picot arrived from London in Switzerland as 
commanding officer of the British prisoners 
of war interned in Switzerland and began for-
malizing their accommodations; the first 304 
British soldiers arrived on May 28, 1916.39 
The urgency of the British government 
originated in part from international reports 
of the arrival of the German and French sol-
diers in Switzerland and the exemplary level 
of care that they received. As the internation-
al agreements fell into place, the Swiss mil-
37 Great Britain, Correspondence with the United 
States Ambassador Respecting the Transfer to Swit-
zerland of British and German Wounded and Sick 
Combatant Prisoners of War,15. 
38 Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz.
39 Mittler, 17.
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itary planned out the locations, regulations, 
and accommodations of the incoming pris-
oners of war. These initial stages in the for-
mation of Swiss internment camps and Swiss 
defensive humanitarian policy rested on both 
the history of internment during the Bourbaki 
event and on the foreign policy initiatives of 
the Swiss government, ICRC, and Holy See 
in the first few years of World War I. 
Changes to the original treaties that creat-
ed the internment camps eventually came in 
1917, when an Anglo-German conference was 
held in The Hague to further discuss POWs, 
extend internment and exchange agreements, 
and resolve issues with the previous treaty. 
Many of these changes directly affected the 
Swiss internment camps, as the diplomats in 
attendance added new categories to the list of 
internment conditions. First, those who had 
been in captivity for at least 18 months and 
were suffering from “barbed wire disease” 
could now be interned in Switzerland, as well 
as any officer, commissioned or not, in cap-
tivity for 18 months.40 This treaty also created 
the opportunity for the internment of 16,000 
POWs in the Netherlands, though this treaty 
was never extended to non-German or British 
soldiers.  
Defensive humanitarianism as a foreign 
policy platform derived its strength not only 
from the actions of the Swiss state, but also 
relied on the assistance of non-governmen-
tal international agencies for its legitimacy. 
It required the investment of trust from oth-
er belligerent and neutral states, such as the 
United States and the Holy See. With ICRC 
and Holy See support of internment in Swit-
zerland on the grounds of humanitarian aid, 
40 This illness is believed to have been PTSD. Speed, 
36-37. 
violating Swiss neutrality changed from an 
issue of national sovereignty to an issue of 
international image and respect for the lofty 
ideals of humanitarianism. This denotes an 
especially significant point considering the 
case of Belgium’s neutrality in World War 
I.41 Switzerland’s ability to offer good offices 
and house POWs in internment camps under 
the promises of neutrality and humanitarian-
ism allowed it a better chance at protecting 
its sovereignty. This allowed for enough trust 
between the belligerents to create a treaty 
that both sides could support and fulfill. Had 
Swiss neutrality been violated, or the ICRC 
and Vatican backing not existed, the Swiss 
defensive humanitarianism platform could 
not have succeeded. Defensive humanitarian-
ism functioned on an explicitly international 
level despite being a form of national foreign 
policy, as it required international acceptance 
for its legitimacy, while its practical under-
taking happened at the ground level.      
The evolution of defensive humanitarian-
ism during the years of 1914-1916 included 
the realization of the last century of inter-
national law in mitigating human suffering 
during armed conflict. The formation of the 
Swiss internment camps took more than just 
the urgings of the ICRC or pope; the unique 
position of Switzerland as a neutral state ca-
pable of enacting the Geneva and The Hague 
Conventions created the conditions suitable to 
craft the internment camp system. Solidifying 
the practicality of defensive humanitarianism 
to the Swiss populace and the international 
41 As far as neutral states acting as hosts for internment 
treaties, the Netherlands held British and German sol-
diers after a treaty between those states was formed 
in 1917. For more information, see John Yarnall’s 
Barbed Wire Disease: British & German Prisoners of 
War, 1914-19.  
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community at large, the treaty negotiations of 
1915-1916 marked a significant turning point 
in the prestige of Swiss good offices. With the 
initial internees beginning their journeys into 
Switzerland, the next phase of defensive hu-
manitarianism began. In this stage, the Swiss 
government would have to make good on the 
humanitarian half of its policy platform. 
Life in the Internment Camp System
When William McGilvray arrived in 
Chateaux D’Oex late in 1916, he could have 
scarcely believed the change in treatment that 
he would receive. The Swiss military and the 
ICRC operated all of the internment camps in 
Switzerland for the duration of World War I, 
yet their daily maintenance and administra-
tion rested in the hands of non-commissioned 
Swiss soldiers and a few of the internees 
themselves. This section explores the human-
itarian aspect of defensive humanitarianism 
by illuminating the unique opportunities and 
freedoms afforded to interned soldiers. From 
work and job training to education, leisure, 
and sport, the Swiss internment camps over-
hauled the traditional POW system. Not all of 
these changes happened smoothly, and some 
failed, but the humanitarian experiment in the 
internment camp system would prove that 
bringing lofty principles into international 
law could bring about practical change. The 
changes in the experiences of these soldiers 
from their time in POW camps in France, 
Germany, Britain, and elsewhere, to their 
lives in the internment camp system repre-
sent more than just a difference in scenery. 
The goal of this section is to lay out the struc-
ture of the internment camp system, elaborate 
on the changes between POW camps and in-
ternment camps, and analyze how the unique 
humanitarian aspects of the Swiss internment 
camp system constitutes the second half of 
defensive humanitarianism. 
The Swiss military housed the interned 
soldiers primarily in hostels and hotels and 
sent severe cases to hospitals and sanatoria. 
The Swiss army required military-level dis-
cipline in the camps, as the interned soldiers 
only had the legal rights of prisoners of war, 
due in part to the small amount of interna-
tional law written specifically on the rights of 
internees as opposed to POWs. However, in 
their accommodations, internees experienced 
abundant comfort in rooms normally meant 
for paying customers, with between one and 
four men inhabiting each fully furnished 
room.42 The day-to-day undertakings of the 
internment system relied on daily reports 
sent to the two regional superintendents, with 
information on attendance, fees accrued by 
soldiers for their rent and board, work as-
signments, changes in soldiers’ health, and 
disciplinary incidents recorded by the staff 
at each hostel, hotel, hospital, and sanitari-
um, not necessarily by military personnel.43 
Indeed, many non-commissioned Swiss sol-
diers served in this position, but they also del-
egated duties to the internees healthy enough 
to work. 
On the surface, the personnel structure 
of the Swiss internment camps appears at 
first glance as extremely hierarchical. The 
Surgeon-General of the Swiss military, lo-
cated centrally in Bern, sat at the top of the 
administrative system, followed by a quar-
termaster-general who oversaw two section-
42 “Internierten-Zeitungen (1916-1918),” Dossier, 
E27#1000/721#14038*, (Schweizerisches Bundesar-
chiv: Bern, Switzerland), accessed June 5, 2017.
43 Favre, “Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War: An 
Experiment in International Humane Legislation and 
Administration: a Report by the Swiss Commission in 
the United States,” 20.
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al superintendents. One was for the Central 
Powers’ soldiers in Lucerne, and the other 
for the Entente Powers in Montreux, with 
non-commissioned Swiss officers acting as 
individual area supervisors. In addition, a 
Bureau of Information, centered in Bern, 
maintained all written records of the camp, 
including the number of soldiers interned in 
Switzerland. To maintain discipline among 
the internees, trusted officers from each in-
dividual location were given the authority 
to oversee their fellow soldiers’ behavior.44 
Despite the hierarchical appearance of the 
system, non-commissioned Swiss soldiers 
and internees completed much of the day-
to-day work of the camp by compiling atten-
dance sheets, distributing mail, and assuring 
work, recreational activities, and leisure time 
proceeded smoothly.45 In fact, in areas with 
internees from multiple nations, groups of 
mixed internees could complete tasks togeth-
er. This relaxed system paralleled the relaxed 
military character of the internment camp 
system; the humanitarian and neutral aspects 
of the system removed the need for a rigid 
power hierarchy. While the treaties focused 
on the higher-level problems of selection, 
transportation, and payment, the Swiss mili-
tary and ICRC primarily handled the ground 
level issues of running the day-to-day aspects 
of the system. This dichotomy between state 
level and individual level authority mirrors a 
similar dichotomy between the defensive and 
humanitarian aspects of defensive humani-
tarianism. While the defensive aspect func-
tions mainly at the international treaty level, 
44 Ibid. 
45 “Verschiedene Listen betr. den Internierten-Bestand 
(1916-1919),” Dossier, E27#1000/721#14032*, (Sch-
weizerisches Bundesarchiv: Bern, Switzerland), ac-
cessed June 5, 2017. 
with state leaders and diplomats as actors, the 
individuals who ensured the daily survival of 
the camps account for the humanitarian half.
The unique humanitarian goal of the in-
ternment camps, reducing the unnecessary 
suffering of prisoners of war due to injury, 
created an entirely new method for handling 
prisoners of war. The new structuring of the 
internment camps resulted in Swiss military 
avoiding gross loss of active Swiss soldiers 
to the cause of guarding interned interna-
tional soldiers.46 Medical staff, hotel staff, 
and non-commissioned soldiers, in addition 
to the internees themselves, took over these 
roles. As the health of soldiers represented 
the primary goal of internment, the daily ac-
tivities and lifestyles of interned soldiers also 
differed dramatically from the traditional ex-
periences of prisoners of war. 
Forced labor has always existed in the 
prisoner of war system; however, the intern-
ment camp system utilized work as a tool to 
improve internee health. One major differ-
ence between traditional prisoner or internee 
labor and the work completed in the Swiss 
camps was the rationale behind the labor. 
This sentiment is evident in Favre’s work, as 
he felt that:
Work is a necessity for interned war 
prisoners. It is the only way to restore 
them after the ravages that sickness, 
wounds, and a long captivity have 
made on their minds and bodies. 
Switzerland must furnish the interned 
prisoner with diversion so that he 
does not become  lazy and fall prey 
46 Favre, “Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War: An 
Experiment in International Humane Legislation and 
Administration: a Report by the Swiss Commission in 
the United States,” 40.  
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to the numerous temptations that he 
finds in our country.47 
The physicians of the camps categorized the 
internees into the six categories of work, re-
moving the chance for misunderstanding as 
to why the soldiers originally interned for 
illness participated in laborious activities. 
The six categories varied in the amount of 
labor and the duration per day of labor. The 
categorization lent itself to the Swiss mod-
el that labor helped to heal, in moderation. 
The Swiss government employed internees 
only in industries that did not compete with 
Swiss labor.48 This dramatically lessened 
the exploitative characteristic of traditional 
prisoner or interned labor and reduced any 
internal fears of labor competition within 
Switzerland. Labor, therefore, took on a hu-
manitarian characteristic: internees labored 
to the benefit of their health and the future 
welfare of their families and states. While 
the Swiss army required all those chosen as 
capable to work, non-commissioned officers 
of the rank of sergeant or above could not be 
forced to work, nor were civilian internees 
required to work.49 
The Swiss government, due to its intense 
scrutiny of idleness, required all interned 
soldiers to report their previous occupations 
before the war and undergo routine health 
assessments by the military medical staff to 
check for work status. Prisoners could not 
refuse the work or studies assigned to them, 
as the Swiss government and army held that 
47 Ibid.
48 “Mitteilungen des Armeefeldarztes an die Presse 
(1916-1918),” Dossier, E27#1000/721#14034*, (Sch-
weizerisches Bundesarchiv: Bern, Switzerland), ac-
cessed June 6, 2017.
49 Civilian internees are not covered in this paper, but 
would make a very interesting future area of research. 
idleness would lead to the deterioration of 
the mental, moral, and physical heath of the 
soldiers. From these reports, the Swiss gov-
ernment fashioned six groups of soldiers: 
those incapable of work, those capable of 
light work within the camp, those capable of 
light work outside the camp, those capable of 
regular work outside the camp, those need-
ing to learn a new profession through appren-
ticeship due to injury, and those interested in 
studying.50 These positions ranged from ad-
ministrative positions such as postal carriers, 
or laborers assisting Swiss citizens around 
their places of internment.
The structuring of interned soldiers’ time 
while captive in Switzerland differs dramati-
cally from how time functions in traditional 
prisoner of war camps. Both The Hague and 
Geneva Conventions allowed for govern-
ments to require prisoners of war to perform 
labor if healthy enough to do so, in accor-
dance with their skills.51 The unique Swiss 
system of internment brought a new aspect 
to the occupation of captive’s time: the op-
portunity to work in their prewar professions 
as well as the opportunity to receive further 
vocational or academic education. The Swiss 
government held that: 
Switzerland must furnish the interned 
prisoner with diversion so that he does 
not become lazy and fall a [sic] prey 
to the numerous temptations that he 
finds in our country. She must make, 
or remake, men of them, so that once 
the war is over they will be capable of 
50 “Vorbereitung für die kriegsrechtliche Internierung, 
u.a. Konventionsentwurf, 1914-1915.”
51 “Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded in Armies in the Field. Geneva, 22 
August 1864.”
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establishing a family; or if they have 
a family, of resuming their life with it 
on a proper basis and so to lift up their 
country.52 
The utilization of the word diversion, as op-
posed to labor, points to the focus on health 
and not on utility that came with the intern-
ment system. It also points to the administra-
tion’s focus on idle time, seen as a detriment 
to the soldier’s character. Why was the Swiss 
military so concerned with the idleness of 
internees? One of the biggest worries of the 
Swiss came from the fear that interned men 
with too much money and free time would 
fall into deleterious social behaviors such as 
alcoholism or gambling. 53 This accounts in 
part for the Swiss government’s insistence 
upon internees working. 
Another factor came from Favre’s person-
al insistence that idle men had a greater risk 
in falling into poor health or breaking rules 
than men with less free time. This paradox of 
diversion, suggesting relaxation and leisure, 
versus the concern with idleness, which im-
plies productivity and usefulness, illustrates 
the tension of running the internment camp 
system with humanitarianism as the ideol-
ogy. New and old concepts of internment 
camps clashed in Favre’s reports of how men 
should spend their time, but the result pro-
duced a middle ground. Soldiers labored to 
their benefit and to the benefit of their state, 
but also participated in recreational sports 
and pastimes and studied at university and 
relaxed in local establishments.  
52 Favre, “Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War: An 
Experiment in International Humane Legislation and 
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53 Ibid, 38.
In traditional prisoner of war camps, 
prisoners of war did not receive any money 
for their labor.54 The Swiss internment camp 
system approach even to the monetary as-
pect of labor is, therefore, exceptional, as 
the Swiss government only withheld 40% 
of an internee’s earnings. The transforma-
tion of labor from a compulsory measure to 
a health initiative radically improved the ex-
periences of the interned soldiers, while si-
multaneously boosting sectors of the Swiss 
economy lagging due to the loss of manpow-
er and tourism. The transformative nature of 
the internment camp system pleased not only 
the interned soldiers and their home govern-
ments, but also the citizens of Switzerland. 
It saved many internees from their deaths in 
the POW camps and also painted Switzerland 
as the humanitarian bastion of Europe. The 
possibility for and success of defensive hu-
manitarianism arose from its unique quality 
of suiting the needs and desires of all sides.  
Sergeant William McGilvray could have 
hardly imagined how he would spend his 
idling hours in internment in Switzerland, 
and he would certainly have never dreamed 
his tenure would include duties such as offici-
ating curling tournaments. As a non-commis-
sioned officer at the level of sergeant upon 
his arrival, McGilvray oversaw the British 
soldiers interned at the Chateaux d’Oex in-
ternment camp as the highest-ranking offi-
cer in 1916. In addition to maintaining mil-
itary-style behavior and conduct, McGilvray 
oversaw the implementation of labor, educa-
tion, and recreation programs that saw to the 
mental welfare of the internees. In June of 
1917, this meant overseeing a curling tour-
54 Heather Jones, “Prisoners of War,” last modified Oc-
tober 8, 2014. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.
net/article/prisoners_of_war.
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nament between the British interned men of 
Chateaux d’Oex and the local female curling 
team. As one of the internees, British Lance 
Corporal Gruchy, wrote home, “I am ex-
tremely comfortable and can hardly realize 
my good fortune. The days as a ‘gefangener’ 
[prisoner] seem like a particularly horrible 
nightmare; thank God they are over…”55 The 
internment system in Switzerland revolution-
ized how prisoners of war could be handled 
by shifting the emphasis from captivity to 
health. Internees were allowed to participate 
in a myriad of recreations, ranging from soc-
cer clubs to symphony orchestras that collab-
orated with the local populace.
The reeducation of internees also played 
a central role in the health initiatives of the 
internment camps, as the healthcare goals 
of the ICRC and Swiss army extended past 
the point of internment and continued into 
the soldiers’ return to civilian life. The treaty 
focused particularly on interned soldiers that 
had been active in their studies before the war 
or on those who would have to learn a new 
skill or trade due to complications from in-
jury or illness. As Favre noted in his report:
 
The Swiss University Work divided 
the regions and sections among the 
different university committees of 
Geneva, Fribourg, Neuchâtel, Berne, 
Zurich, Bâle; procured books for 
study, created or developed regional 
libraries, facilitated access to the li-
braries already in existence, and or-
ganized conferences and lectures … 
the normal, secondary, and profes-
sional schools, the schools of com-
merce, etc., opened their courses to 
55 “The London Scottish Regimental Gazette,” 136.
interned pupils and students … Only 
the interned men fulfilling the regular 
conditions were to have the status of 
regular students. The others who gave 
evidence of satisfactory educational 
training were admitted as auditors.56
The Swiss army, while allowing the in-
terned soldiers almost complete access to the 
Swiss education system, was very concerned 
that the opportunity of education would be 
abused by internees who were distracted by 
the “agreeable pursuits of a stay in the city, 
and who do not see anything better, the lazy, 
the incapable, the non-serious.”57 The Swiss 
army held the reeducation of the interned sol-
diers as similarly important to the health of the 
internee and something deserving of serious 
attention. While Favre’s report shows that he 
held a level of cynicism towards the intent of 
student internees, he went on to include that 
any infractions that transpired happened only 
in a fraction of the student internee popula-
tion, as trusted internees acted as observers 
of the less trustworthy students for the camp 
administration, just as other officer-level in-
ternees oversaw the men in their area. Here 
we see the give-and-take aspect of defensive 
humanitarianism: while the humanitarian as-
pect of the internment camp system pursued 
as many opportunities for interned soldiers as 
possible during their time in Switzerland, the 
defensive aspect attempted to hold them to 
traditional military standards of behavior and 
structure. The humanitarian half cared for the 
internee, while the defensive half utilized the 
56 Favre, “Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War: An 
Experiment in International Humane Legislation and 
Administration: a Report by the Swiss Commission in 
the United States,” 25.
57 Ibid., 26.
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internee to protect Swiss national security. 
Though the doubts of the Swiss army in re-
gards to the humanitarian ideals of the intern-
ment camp system may be seen in Favre’s re-
port, at no point did he denounce or criticize 
them explicitly.
Additionally, the social halls in each camp 
acted as a creative refuge, as opposed to a café 
or bar where alcohol would have been used 
as the relaxant. Social halls were venues des-
ignated as group activity spaces for internees. 
Favre’s report illustrates the morale of intern-
ees also played a role in the humanitarian goal 
of long-term physical health. As Favre notes, 
It is obviously good for the interned 
men that alcohol is not an indispens-
able element of sociability. The help 
to each is beneficial and the morale is 
elevated by lectures, dramatic perfor-
mances, and concerts given from time 
to time. Interned men who take part 
in these things find an interest which 
keeps them from idleness. At St. Le-
gier, Blonay, the social hall is opened 
only twice a week and yet is a source 
of constant interest. These meetings 
are attended, on average, by two-
thirds of the interned men in the sec-
tion. Certain social halls are used for 
other purposes. That at Mürren, the 
English social hall shelters the Tem-
perance Rambling Club, with sev-
enty members, and the orchestra of 
interned men, and courses are given, 
with instruction in wood-carving.58
58 Favre, “Swiss Internment of Prisoners of War: An 
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Various commissions of Swiss nationals 
worked to broaden the opportunities of the 
interned, including the Commission from the 
Christian Associations, Commission of Ger-
man Switzerland, The Swiss Catholic Mis-
sion, and the Swiss Society of Chaplains. The 
role of these commissions focused primarily 
on religion and the spirituality of the internee. 
The uniquely humanitarian aspect of 
the Swiss internment camp system differen-
tiates them from traditional prisoner of war 
or internment camp systems by focusing on 
long-term health and lifestyle goals, instead 
of punitive or reprisal measures. The intern-
ment camp system, run to a large extent by 
the internees themselves, focused on improv-
ing more than just the immediate health of 
the interned. While work was a traditional as-
pect of both POW and internment camps, the 
utilization of work for the express purpose 
of healthcare goals differentiates internment 
camps dramatically from other models. 
The reeducation of internees through 
both vocational training and university 
schooling presents perhaps the most appar-
ent transformation and showcases the fu-
ture-oriented outlook of the internment camp 
system. Keeping the future of internees after 
internment in mind, the structuring of the 
internment camp system sought to facilitate 
soldiers’ transition back to civilian life. As a 
non-belligerent in the conflict, the Swiss had 
no acrimony towards the internees, removing 
any structural opportunities for pernicious in-
tent. This enabled the humanitarian aspect of 
the camps to flourish, resulting in the change 
from conceptualizing the soldiers’ stay from 
short-term confinement to long-lasting health 
and professional goals. The humanitarian as-
pect of defensive humanitarianism cannot be 
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understated. The defensive property, enabled 
by the internment camp system, benefitted 
the neutral Swiss state in political and eco-
nomic terms, keeping the Swiss safer from 
external invasion and internal conflict. The 
humanitarian half, on the other hand, had a 
greater impact at the individual level. The de-
fensive and humanitarian aspects intertwined 
and mutually depended on each other, and 
their disentanglement would have crippled 
the system. 
Conclusion
The initial reports on the arrival of in-
terned soldiers in Switzerland came from the 
governments involved and the vast majority 
contained very positive sentiments. Many 
accounts, especially from British officials, 
contain descriptions of the levels of enthusi-
asm of the Swiss populace at the arrival of 
newly interned soldiers. Reports conflict as 
to whether soldiers arrived on third-class cars 
that had been transformed into medical cars, 
or if officers rode first class and enlisted men 
in second, but this is truly minor in the grand 
scheme of the internment camp system.59 Al-
most all reports contain accounts of the types 
of gifts received by soldiers at stations and 
restaurants as they travelled through Swit-
zerland to their assigned internment location, 
where they also received attention and gifts 
from individual Swiss citizens. 
Defensive humanitarianism was success-
ful due to its international character and gov-
ernments with or without interned soldiers 
took an interest in the project. A plethora of 
reports exist in English from both the Brit-
59 Grant Mountstuart, Evelyn Duff and Heron Charles 
Goodhart, The Reception of Wounded Prisoner Sol-
diers of Great Britain in Switzerland, (London: Jas. 
Truscott & Son, 1916), 6.
ish government officials and the internees in 
Switzerland. One report, from Heron Charles 
Goodhart, a member of the British legation 
in Switzerland, states that, “fruit, cigarettes, 
chocolate and postcards, besides flowers in 
profusion, were the principal gifts brought 
by private individuals, many of whom were 
Swiss. The British Colony were [sic] in full 
force.”60 While the level of enthusiasm of the 
Swiss populace recorded by many British 
officials illustrated the international use of 
internment in Switzerland as a form of mo-
rale building for their local populations, the 
vast majority of accounts captured the truly 
positive feelings of the Swiss welcoming of 
interned soldiers. 
In addition to the protection of Swiss 
neutrality and international prominence for 
the humanitarian goals of internment, the fi-
nancial benefits to the tourism sector of the 
Swiss economy due to the housing of interned 
soldiers in hotels and hostels likely explains 
the overwhelmingly positive Swiss reception 
of interned soldiers. The Swiss government, 
with the input of NGOs and other states, cre-
ated defensive humanitarianism and the in-
ternment camp system both to protect Swiss 
sovereignty and to allow for humanitarian 
ideals to survive in a new and destructive era. 
Both sides of the coin, defense and humani-
tarianism, equally showed through in the in-
ternment camp system.
The transformation from POW camp to 
internment camp could not have transpired 
without the existing international legal basis 
of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as 
well as the ICRC, Swiss Red Cross, and oth-
er international humanitarian organizations. 
The internment systems evolved in response 
60 Ibid., 7. 
44
to the new challenges presented by WWI by 
reevaluating the costs of total war and rev-
olutionizing the care of its casualties. The 
Swiss government chose to move forward 
with internment not exclusively out of hu-
manitarian ideals but also out of financial and 
political considerations. The reconfiguring 
of norms around POW treatment remains an 
important example of how states may pursue 
humanitarian policy when considering their 
treatment of foreign soldiers. 
The term defensive humanitarianism is 
useful for describing the policy platform im-
plemented by the Swiss state to assuage the 
crises of WWI. The application of domestic 
policy through international agreements and 
humanitarian law presents a unique approach 
that small states may use to maintain their 
sovereignty. This episode in history touched 
not only the domestic Swiss level, but in-
fluenced the histories of WWI, internation-
al diplomacy, and humanitarianism as well. 
Switzerland, often overlooked in the histo-
riographies of these three larger areas due to 
the state’s small player status during the 20th 
century, still may offer valuable policy alter-
natives today. 
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